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Victor v. Nebraska and Sandoval v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1239
(1994)
I. INTRODUCrION
The United States Supreme Court denied the defendants' ap-
peals in the consolidated cases of Vctor v. Nebraska and Sandoval v.
California.' In each case, the petitioner argued that the state trial
court's reasonable doubt jury instruction suggested that a lower stan-
dard of proof was necessary for conviction than the standard required
by constitutional due process.
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor admitted that the rea-
sonable doubt instructions contained language that was not entirely
clear. However, she explained that, taken in context and viewed as a
whole, the instructions adequately conveyed the concept of reason-
able doubt 2 Justice O'Connor's opinion greatly narrowed the scope
of the Court's recent per curiam decision in Cage v. Louisiana,3 the
case upon which both petitioners had formulated their appeals. Jus-
tice O'Connor based her conclusion, as to the meaning of reasonable
doubt and the phrases challenged by petitioners, upon a historical
analysis of the reasonable doubt concept and upon eighteenth and
nineteenth-century case law and texts.4 Though expressing disap-
proval of the reasonable doubt instructions at issue in both Victor and
in Sandova, Justice O'Connor stopped short of setting forth an exem-
plary jury instruction and thus failed to clear up the confusion as to
what sort of instruction the Court would endorse outright.
This Note begins by reviewing the concept of reasonable doubt
and its historical development, both in case law and in treatises, plac-
ing special emphasis on the Court's relatively recent history of inter-
1 Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
2 Id. at 1251.
3 498 U.S. 39 (1990).
4 Vctor, 114 S. Ct. at 1244-45.
5 Id. at 1248, 1251.
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preting the reasonable doubt standard. Next, this Note finds fault
with the Court's holding in both Sandoval and Victor, arguing that the
Court has improperly narrowed the important constitutional safe-
guards upheld in Cage to the facts of Cage alone, leaving the states with
no valuable guidance as to how to instruct on the concept of reason-
able doubt. This Note also contends that the Court lowered the stan-
dard of proof necessary to convict a defendant by upholding these two
convictions, even though the juries' received ambiguous and mislead-
ing definitions of reasonable doubt. Finally, this Note explores the
Court's motivation for such an about-face with respect to the tenets of
Cage and discusses the likely ramifications of the Court's holding for
the future of criminal jurisprudence.
II. BACKGROUND
A. REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution requires the State to prove every element
of a charged criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.6 The rea-
sonable doubt standard had its first documented beginnings in the
eighteenth century in England and America. There are two fre-
quently cited theories regarding the first appearance of the concept of
reasonable doubt in English and American case law.
On the one hand, Judge John Wilder May, a nineteenth-century
editor and author of numerous treatises, concluded that, as far as he
could determine, the reasonable doubt standard was first employed in
the Irish treason trials in 1798. 7 During the trial of Rex v. Finney in
Dublin, the defense counsel stated that it "may ... be considered a
rule of law, that, if the jury entertain a reasonable doubt upon the
truth of the testimony of witnesses given upon the issue they are sworn
well and truly to try, they are bound" to acquit.9 Citing this case,
Judge May concluded that its use in Ireland predated its use in the
United States.
Alternatively, Professor Morano asserted that the English and
6 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
7 John Wilder May, Some Rules of Evidence: Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal Cases,
10 AM. L RFv. 642, 656 (1876). Both Dean McCormick and Dean Wigmore acfepted this
theory in their respective treatises on evidence, and the United States Supreme Court men-
tioned it in Apodaca v. Oregon. See CHARts T. McCoRMicK, LAIw OF EvIDENCE § 341, at
799 (2d ed. 1972); 9 WIoMORE § 2497, at 317 (3d ed. 1940); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404, 412 n.6 (1972); see generally Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of
the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REv. 507, 508 (1975).
8 26 How. St. Tr. 1019 (Ire. 1798).
9 May, supra note 7, at 656-57.
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American courts employed the reasonable doubt standard even ear-
lier in the eighteenth century.'0 As an example, Professor Morano
cited the language used in the Boston Massacre Trials of 1770. Argu-
ing for the conviction of British soldiers who had fired into a crowd of
Boston residents who were protesting British military presence in the
colonies, counsel for the British Crown, Robert Treat Paine, stated:
[I]f therefor in the examination of this Cause the Evidence is not suffi-
cient to Convince you beyond reasonable doubt of the Guilt of all or of
any of the Prisoners by the Benignity and Reason of the Law you will
acquit them, but if the Evidence be sufficient to convince you of their
Guilt beyond reasonable doubt the Justice of the Law will require you to
declare them Guilty and the Benignity of the Law will be satisfied in the
fairness and impartiality of their Tryal. 11
B. REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Despite the different theories as to the source of the concept,
historians agree that the reasonable doubt standard did not become a
fixture of American jurisprudence until the mid-nineteenth century.
12
By then, the reasonable doubt standard had become widely accepted
as the accurate description of the degree of doubt necessary for ac-
quittal of a criminal defendant' s State courts gradually accepted the
reasonable doubt standard, each following its own time line in ac-
cepting itl4 Studies of early decisions of the state courts have re-
vealed that many state appellate courts did not require trial courts to
use the reasonable doubt standard until after they had already begun
to use it.15 The standard's growing acceptance was concurrent with
judicial attempts to explain the meaning of reasonable doubt.
16
In addition to its growing importance in case law, the reasonable
doubt standard appeared frequently in nineteenth-century treatises.
10 Morano, supra note 7, at 508.
11 3 L. KINVIN WROTH AND Hi.LER B. ZOBEL, LEGAL PAPERS OFJOHN ADAMS 271 (1965).
12 Morano, supra note 7, at 519. Morano noted two barriers to the acceptance of the
reasonable doubt standard: (1) juries in many states in the early 1800s decided both ques-
tions of law and questions of fact, and thus, the jury itself determined the standard of
persuasion; and (2) there were inadequate methods of appellate review of challenged con-
victions, which impeded a uniform standard of persuasion. Id. at 524-26.
Is See, e.g., Carlton v. People, 150 fI1. 181, 192 (1894); Morgan v. State, 48 Ohio St. 371,
377 (1891); People v. Strong, 30 Cal. 151, 155 (1866); Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass.
295 (1850).
14 Morano, supra note 7, at 519. Morano noted two problems in verifying the early use
of the reasonable doubt standard: (1) few trial transcripts survive from the years 1750-
1830; and (2) in many criminal cases, trial court proceedings were not recorded. Id. at
520. See also H. Richard Uviller, Acquitting the Guilty: Two Case Studies on Jury Misgivings and
the Misunderstood Standard of Proof, 2 CrM. LF. 1, 38 (1990).




Dean Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, stated that "[w]hen the
risk of jury-doubt is exclusively on the prosecution, their belief must
amount to a sense of being morally certain beyond any reasonable doubt, i.e.
in favor of the prosecutor's contention." 7 Simon Greenleaf also re-
ferred to reasonable doubt in describing the amount of proof re-
quired in a criminal case, stating that facts are proven by satisfactory
evidence which is "that amount of proof... which ordinarily satisfies
an unprejudiced mind... beyond a reasonable doubt."18
Through its repeated use in both case law and in legal treatises,
reasonable doubt became, by the end of the nineteenth century, the
uniformly applied standard for the degree of doubt necessary to ac-
quit a defendant of a charged criminal offense. In addition, courts
began to use jury instructions to ensure that jurors paid attention to
the law pertinent to the case and did not merely follow popular opin-
ion in deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 19 In 1895,
the Supreme Court decreed, in Sparf v. United States,20 that the jury is
required, in criminal cases, to follow the trial court's instructions on
the law.
2 1
C. REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Although courts used the reasonable doubt standard extensively
by the close of the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme
Court did not give it constitutional status until its decision in In re
Winship.22 In Winship, the Court held that the "Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged."23 In reaching its position, the Court found that
"[a]lthough virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt
standard in common-lawjurisdictions may not conclusively establish it
as a requirement of due process, such adherence does 'reflect a
profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced
and justice administered.'
24
17 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2856, at 502-03 (2d ed. 1935).
18 SIMON GREENLEAF, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1, at 4 (13th ed. 1876).
19 Prior to the nineteenth century, juries were considered capable of determining the
law from community norms, and, thus, judges did not instruct juries as to the applicable
law of the case. For a discussion of the early history and development ofjury instructions
in England and America, see William W. Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and
Remedies, 69 CAL. L. REV. 731, 732-37 (1981).
20 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
21 Id. at 106.
22 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
23 Id. at 364.
24 Id. at 361-62 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)).
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The Court in Winship posited two purposes of the reasonable
doubt standard to support its holding.25 First, the reasonable doubt
standard is a "prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions
resting on factual error" since the standard "provides concrete sub-
stance for the presumption of innocence."26 The standard is neces-
sary because the defendant in a criminal case "has at stake interests of
immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose
his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would
be stigmatized by the conviction."27 Second, the reasonable doubt
standard is "indispensable to command the respect and confidence of
the community in applications of the criminal law."28 The reasonable
doubt standard instills confidence in the community that the criminal
justice system will not convict innocent people.
29
After the Supreme Court's decision in Winship secured constitu-
tional status for the reasonable doubt standard, the Court's involve-
ment in the reasonable doubt standard has largely been to define how
and to what extent the reasonable doubt standard needs explaining.
While it is well established that courts and juries must apply the rea-
sonable doubt standard when determining the guilt or innocence of a
criminal defendant,3 0 neither the majority opinion nor the concur-
rence in Winship discussed whether the Constitution requires jury in-
structions defining the standard.31 The Court in Taylor v. Kentucky9
2
held that the trial court's refusal to give the defendant's requested
instruction on the presumption of innocence constituted a violation
of due process.3 3 The Court further noted that if trial courts defined
the reasonable doubt standard, the Constitution did not require any
particular words to instruct the jury as to the appropriate burden of
proof.3
In handling constitutional challenges to specific reasonable
25 Id. at 363-64. For a full discussion of these two reasons for the reasonable doubt
standard, see Barbara D. Underwood, Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE LJ.
1299, 1306-08 (1977).
26 Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 364.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See Henry A. Diamond, Reasonable Doubt: To Define, or Not to Dine, 90 COLUM. L. REv.
1716, 1717-21 (1990), for a discussion of the federal and state courts that do and do not
require thatjury instructions include a definition of reasonable doubt. In his article, Dia-
mond contends that defining reasonable doubt is constitutionally required to guarantee
that the jury understands the reasonable doubt standard. Id. at 1722-29.
32 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
33 Id. at 490.
34 Id. at 485-86.
1995] 993
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doubt instructions, the Court in Francis v. Franklin3 5 made it clear that
it would consider "what a reasonable juror could have understood the
charge as meaning."36
In its evaluations of the constitutionality of reasonable doubt jury
instructions, the Court has only once held that a reasonable doubt
jury instruction given by a trial court violated due process. In Cage v.
Louisiana,3 7 the defendant appealed his conviction and death sen-
tence for first-degree murder, arguing that the reasonable doubt jury
instruction was unconstitutional. In a per curiam decision, the United
States Supreme Court held that the instruction was inimical to the
reasonable doubt standard articulated in Winship.38 In reaching its
decision that the reasonable doubt instruction was unconstitutional,
the Court, following Francis, inquired whether a reasonable juror
"could have" interpreted the instruction to allow conviction on proof
that did not satisfy the reasonable doubt standard which the Due Pro-
cess Clause requires.
3 9
Since the Court's decision in Cage, the Court has altered the in-
quiry for appellate review articulated in Francis and followed in Cage.
Reviewing two Californiajury instructions used in the penalty phase of
a capital murder trial, the Court in Boyde v. Calformia'0 determined
that the proper inquiry was whether there is a "reasonable likelihood
that the jury has applied the challenged instruction" in a way that vio-
lates the Constitution.41 The Court rejected the "could have" test that
it used in finding the Cage instruction unconstitutional, concluding
that the "reasonable likelihood" test "better accommodates the con-
cerns of finality and accuracy."42 While acknowledging that an inter-
35 471 U.S. 307 (1985). In Francis, the Court held that the trial court's jury instruction
on intent in the context of the instruction as a whole violated the 14th Amendment. Id. at
325. Determining that the deficiency in the instruction was not harmless error, the Court
affirmed the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 326.
36 Id. at 316. The more narrow inquiry in Francis was whether a reasonable juror "could
have understood [the instruction on intent] as a mandatory presumption that shifted to
the defendant the burden of persuasion on the element of intent once the State had
proved the predicate acts." Id.
37 498 U.S. 39 (1990).
38 Id. at 40-41.
39 Id. at 41.
40 494 U.S. 370 (1990). In Boyde, the Court held that two California jury instructions
used in the penalty phase of defendant's capital murder trial did not preclude the jury's
consideration of relevant mitigating evidence offered by the defendant, and the jury in-
structions did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 386.
41 Id. at 380. See also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (using the "reasonable
likelihood" test developed in Boyde). In Estelle, the Court held that neither the introduc-
tion of challenged evidence at defendant's murder trial nor the jury instruction on the use
of the challenged evidence violated the Due Process Clause. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75.
42 Id.
994 [Vol. 85
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est in ensuring an "accurate determination of the appropriate
sentence" in a criminal case, the Court in Boyde stressed that its ap-
proval of the "reasonable likelihood" inquiry protected the "equally
strong policy" against requiring retrial years after the first trial where
the "claimed errors amount to no more than speculation."43 In Estelle
v. McGuire,44 the Court further elaborated on its standard for review of
challenged jury instructions and stated that the "instruction 'may not
be judged in artificial isolation,' but must be considered in the con-
text of the instructions as a whole."45
Most recently, the Court held, in Sullivan v. Louisiana,46 that the
giving of a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction was
among those constitutional errors that required an automatic reversal
of the conviction.47 In doing so, the Court rejected the lower court's
finding that the erroneous instruction was harmless error.48
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. SANDOVAL V. CALIFOINIA
On 14 October 1984, Alfred Arthur Sandoval shot and killed both
Gilbert Martinez and Anthony Aceves and wounded Manuel Torres in
a gang-related incident in Los Angeles. 49 Seventeen days later, Sando-
val entered the home of Ray and Marlene Wells and shot and killed
Ray Wells because he had given information to the police concerning
the Martinez and Aceves murders.50 Sandoval then killed Marlene
Wells because she had seen Sandoval kill her husband.51
At trial, Sandoval argued that he had killed Martinez and Aceves
in self-defense, and Sandoval further presented an alibi defense for
the Wells murders. 52 The trial court gave the following reasonable
43 Id.
44 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
45 Este!/e, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). See also
Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (stating that "taken as a whole, the
instructions [must] correctly convey[ ] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury").
46 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2082 (1998). The jury instruction in Sullivan included a definition
of reasonable doubt nearly identical to that in Cage. Id. at 2080. See infra note 182 for the
complete text of the reasonable doubt jury instruction presented in Cage.
47 Id.
48 Id. Justice Scalia found that appellate review of the erroneous reasonable doubt in-
struction using the harmless error standard articulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18 (1967), would be "meaningless" since the appellate court would have to speculate as to
what ajury might have done absent the erroneous instruction. Id.
49 Brief for Respondent at 1, Sandoval v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (No. 92-
9049).
50 Id.
51 Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. at 1243.
52 Respondent's Brief at 1, Sandoval (No. 92-9049).
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doubt instruction to the jury at the end of the guilt phase of the trial:
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is
satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This pre-
sumption places upon the People the burden of proving him guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is
not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs,
and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imagi-
nary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison
and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in
that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. 53
The jury convicted Sandoval of four counts of first degree murder
and, in addition, found that Sandoval used a firearm in the commis-
sion of each offense and had committed multiple murders.54 After
the penalty phase of the trial, the jury sentenced Sandoval to death for
the murder of Marlene Wells and to life in prison without possibility
of parole for the murders of Martinez, Aceves, and Ray Wells. 55
Following Sandoval's convictions and sentences, he was accorded
an automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court.56 On appeal,
Sandoval presented ten contentions concerning the guilt phase of the
trial proceedings57 and eight regarding the sentencing phase.58 As
53 CaliforniaJury Instructions-Criminal 2.90 (1993) [hereinafter CALJIC 2.90]; Victor
v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. at 1244. The trial court gave the same "reasonable doubt" instruc-
tion to the jury during the penalty phase of the trial. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Sandoval v.
California, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (No. 92-9049).
54 wtor, 114 S. Ct. at 1243.
55 Id. at 1244.
56 People v. Sandoval, 844 P.2d 862, 866 (Cal. 1992).
57 On appeal, Sandoval argued these nine issues in addition to the issue of the reason-
able doubt jury instruction: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the
Martinez and Aceves murders from the Wells murders; (2) the trial court erred in permit-
ting the prosecutor to exercise his peremptory challenges to excuse from the jury those
prospective jurors who had expressed concern about the imposition of the death penalty;,
(3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his gang membership as it was irrelevant
and prejudicial to his defense; (4) the trial court improperly excluded evidence of third
party culpability as to the Wells murders; (5) the trial court erred in ruling that his prior
conviction for assault with intent to commit murder would be admissible for impeachment
purposes; (6) the trial court's refusal to rule on the scope of permissible cross-examination
if he took the witness stand to testify on the Martinez and Aceves murders violated his right
to testify on his own behalf; (7) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in his
questioning of the forensic psychiatrist who testified as an expert witness for the defense;
(8) the prosecutor committed multiple instances of prejudicial misconduct during the
cross-examination of Ralph Ortega who was Sandoval's alibi witness with respect to the
Wells murders; and (9) the prosecutor committed additional instances of prejudicial mis-
conduct. Id. at 869-78.
58 In the penalty phase, Sandoval argued that (1) the erroneous admission of his gang
affiliation during the guilt phase prejudiced him in the penalty phase since he had to call
Richard Rodriguez, a gang consultant with the California Youth Authority, to rebut the
evidence of his gang affiliation and the prosecutor improperly cross-examined Rodriguez;
996 [Vol. 85
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part of his appeal, Sandoval, citing Cage, claimed that the jury instruc-
tion on reasonable doubt was constitutionally flawed.59
Regarding the issues Sandoval raised concerning the guilt phase
of the trial, the California Supreme Court found no merit in Sando-
val's assignments of error.60 With respect to Sandoval's argument that
the trial court's reasonable doubt jury instruction was unconstitu-
tional, the court stated that "similar challenges" to the instruction had
been raised and rejected in People v. Jennings6' and in People v. John-
son.62 In these cases, the court had noted that "despite use of the term
'moral certainty' in CALJIC 2.90, the instruction does not suffer from
the flaws condemned in Cage."63 In addition, the court stated that
changes in the reasonable doubt instruction needed to come from the
California Legislature."
The court also examined each of the assignments of error Sando-
val made concerning the penalty phase of the trial.65 Although the
court determined that the biblical references the prosecutor made
during his final argument were improper and constituted misconduct,
the court found that the misconduct did not require reversal of the
penalty imposed upon Sandoval.66 On 14 December 1992, the court
affirmed Sandoval's convictions and sentences.
67
Following the affirmance of his convictions and sentences, Sando-
val filed a petition for rehearing, which the California Supreme Court
(2) the court improperly allowed the jury to consider his age as a factor in aggravation; (3)
the prosecutor violated Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), by urging the jury to consider characteristics of the victims
and the loss suffered by the victims' families; (4) the prosecutor violated his rights to due
process, a fair trial, separation of church and state, and freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment by quoting biblical authority in his final argument; (5) the trial court coerced
the jury's verdict by requiring it to continue deliberating after the jury had declared a
deadlock; (6) the trial court erred in requiring thejury to return a separate penalty verdict
as to each of the four murder victims since the multiple verdicts prevented the jury from
reaching a determination of the appropriate sentence taking into account all the aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances; (7) the instruction on the standards for determining the
penalty verdicts did not inform the jury that a necessary condition for imposition of the
death penalty is a finding that aggravation outweighs mitigation rather than merely being
"so substantial in comparison"; and (8) the cumulative effect of the errors during the pen-
alty phase of the trial required reversal of the penalty imposed. Id. at 880-86.
59 Id. at 878. Sandoval filed his contention as to the unconstitutionality of the "reason-
able doubt" instruction in a supplemental brief. Id.
60 Id. at 869-78.
61 807 P.2d 1009 (Cal. 1991).
62 842 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1992).
63 Sandova, 841 P.2d at 878.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 880-86.
66 Id. at 882-84.
67 Id. at 886.
19951
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denied on 10 February 1993.68 On 10 June 1993, Sandoval filed for a
writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which the
Court granted on 28 September 1993.69 The Court limited the writ to
whether "California's patternjury instruction on reasonable doubt de-
prive[d] petitioner of due process and a fair jury trial by inviting his
jury to base its verdict on improper 'moral' considerations rather than
on an evidentiary evaluation."
70
B. VICTOR V. NEBRASKA
On 26 December 1987, Clarence Victor went to the home of
eighty-two-year-old Alice Singleton, a woman for whom he had previ-
ously done gardening work.7' Upon entering her home, Victor hit
Singleton with his hand and knocked her down, struck her in the
head three times with a pipe, cut her throat with a knife,72 and then
left.73 The medical examiner determined that Singleton died from
the laceration of a branch of the carotid artery with subsequent
hemorrhaging; it took approximately three to five minutes for her to
bleed to death. 74
Following the closing arguments of Victor's trial, the court in-
structed the jury on first degree murder, second degree murder, and
manslaughter, and on the material elements of each crime.75 The
court informed the jury that if the State failed to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt any of the material elements of a particular crime, then
it was the jury's duty to find Victor not guilty of that particular
crime.7 6 The trial court gave the following jury instruction:
"Reasonable doubt" is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and
prudent person, in one of the graver and more important transactions
of life, to pause and hesitate before taking the represented facts as true
and relying and acting thereon. It is such a doubt as will not permit you,
after full, fair, and impartial consideration of all the evidence, to have an
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the guilt of the accused. At
the same time, absolute or mathmatical certainty is not required. You
may be convinced of the truth of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt and
yet be fully aware that possibly you may be mistaken. You may find an
accused guilty upon the strong probabilities of the case, provided such
probabilities are strong enough to exclude any doubt of his guilt that is
68 Petitioner's Brief at 1, Sandoval (No. 92-9049).
69 Id.; Sandoval v. California, 114 S. Ct. 40 (1993).
70 Respondent's Brief at 1, Sandoval (No. 92-9049).
71 Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1249 (1994).
72 Id.
73 Petitioner's Brief at 6, Victor (No. 92-8894).
74 Respondent's Brief at 5, Victor (No. 92-8894).
75 Petitioner's Brief at 8, Victor (No. 92-8894).
76 Id.
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reasonable. A reasonable doubt is an actual and substantial doubt rea-
sonably arising from the evidence, from the facts and circumstances
shown by the evidence, or from the lack of evidence on the part of the
state, as distinguished from a doubt arising from mere possibility, from
bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture.
77
The jury found Victor guilty of first degree murder and use of a
weapon to commit a felony.7 8 A three-judge panel sentenced Victor
to death on 26 August 1988 for the murder conviction and sentenced
him to a consecutive sentence of twenty years for the felony weapon
offense.
79
Under Nebraska law, Victor was afforded a mandatory direct ap-
peal of his conviction and sentence to the Nebraska Supreme Court.80
On appeal, Victor raised six issues."' The court reviewed each of
Victor's assignments of error and found each one was meritless. Thus,
the court affirmed the convictions and sentences.
82
Following the Nebraska Supreme Court's affirmance of Victor's
convictions and sentence, Victor filed a petition for writ of certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court on 16 November 1990, which
the Court denied on 25 February 1991.83
Victor next filed a motion for post-conviction relief with the Ne-
77 NebraskaJury Instruction 14.08 [hereinafter NJI 14.08]; Vritor, 114 S. Ct. at 1249.
78 State v. Victor, 457 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Neb. 1990).
79 State v. Victor, 494 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Neb. 1993).
80 Id.
81 Victor raised these issues: (1) the court should have suppressed statements by Victor
to the Omaha police department; (2) NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2523(1) (d) is unconstitutionally
vague and allows for arbitrary application in a capital sentencing proceeding, (3) the three-
judge sentencing panel improperly considered evidence of his 1964 manslaughter confes-
sion in support of its finding that the prosecution proved NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2523(1) (a)
beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that
the prosecution proved NEB. Rrv. STAT. § 29-2523(1) (d) beyond a reasonable doubt; (5)
the three-judge sentencing panel erroneously found that he had not proven mitigating
circumstance NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2523(2) (g); and (6) the three-judge sentencing panel
erred in finding the sentence of death was not disproportionate or excessive. Victor, 235
Neb. at 773. Section 29-2523(1) (d) reads: "[tihe murder was especially heinous, atrocious,
cruel, or manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standard of morality and intelli-
gence." Section 29-2523(1) (a) allows the existence of an aggravating circumstance where
the defendant had been "previously convicted of another murder or a crime involving the
use of the threat of violence to the person, or has a substantial history of serious assaultive
or terrorizing criminal activity." Finally, § 29-2523 (2) (g) reads: "At the time of the crime,
the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental illness, mental
defect, or intoxication."
82 Id. at 796.
83 Brief for Respondent at 5, Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (No. 92-8894);
Victor v. Nebraska, 498 U.S. 1127 (1991). Victor filed a supplement to his petition for a
writ of certiorari on 15January 1991, specifically addressing the issues raised in the Court's
decision in Cage handed down on 13 November 1990.
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braska District Court of Douglas County on 10 May 1991.84 This mo-
tion for post-conviction relief was Victor's first habeas corpus
proceeding at the trial level under the Nebraska Post-Conviction
Act.85 In this proceeding, Victor raised eight issues, including the
contention that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the
law regarding the concept of reasonable doubt.8 6 Victor argued that,
based on the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Cage,87 he
had been prejudiced by the trial court's reasonable doubt instruc-
tion.88 The district court denied post-conviction relief, finding that
the Cage decision was not handed down until Victor's conviction and
affirmance of the conviction on appeal to the Nebraska Supreme
Court.8 9 Furthermore, since the United States Supreme Court failed
to indicate whether the effect of its decision in Cage was retroactive,
the district court determined that it should not apply the decision
retroactively.9
0
Subsequently, Victor appealed the district court's denial of post-
conviction relief to the Nebraska Supreme Court.91 Victor made four
claims in his appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, asserting primar-
ily that the Nebraska District Court, in denying his motion for post-
conviction relief, erred in failing to apply Cage retroactively with re-
gard to the reasonable doubt jury instruction.92 On 29 January 1993,
84 Respondent's Brief at 6, litor (No. 92-8894).
85 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-3001 to 29-3004 (1993).
86 State v. Victor, 494 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Neb. 1993). Victor based his petition on al-
leged violations of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution and alleged violations of article I, sections 3, 9, and 13 of the Nebraska
Constitution. The other seven issues Victor argued were that (1) the reweighing process
for aggravating and mitigating circumstances engaged in by the Nebraska Supreme Court
was unconstitutional; (2) the Court improperly imposed the death penalty because the
aggravating circumstance in NEB. RE,. STAT. § 29-2523(1) (d) is vague and results in an
arbitrary imposition of capital punishment; (3) the three-judge sentencing panel and the
Nebraska Supreme Court erroneously refused to consider defendant's inability to conform
his conduct to law because of mental defect or intoxication as required by NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2523(2) (g); (4) neither the three-judge sentencing panel nor the Nebraska Supreme
Court compared the facts of his case with other cases of same or similar circumstances to
determine the proportionality of defendant's sentences with other cases; (5) the three-
judge sentencing panel erroneously admitted defendant's confession to a 1964 manslaugh-
ter as the confession did not conform to Miranda requirements; (6) his confession to the
Singleton murder was not voluntary, was a product of an unlawful arrest, and was obtained
without a valid waiver of his Miranda rights; and (7) trial and appellate counsel was ineffec-
tive in failing to raise or in improperly raising each of the aforementioned issues. Id.
87 498 U.S. 39 (1990).
88 Brief for Petitioner at 9, Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (No. 92-8894).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Brief for Respondent at 6, Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (No. 92-8894).
92 Victor also argued that the court erred in (1) refusing to grant an evidentiary hear-
ing; (2) failing to appoint counsel to represent him for his motion to vacate his sentence
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the Nebraska Supreme Court, "finding no merit in the assignments of
error properly before this court," affirmed the decision of the district
court "in its entirety."93 The court, relying on its decision in State v.
Morley, rejected Victor's contention that the trial court's instruction
on reasonable doubt suggested a higher degree of doubt than that
required under the Fourteenth Amendment.94 In Morey, the court
upheld the constitutionality of a nearly identical reasonable doubt in-
struction.95 The court held that Victor's assigned error had been de-
cided by the Morey opinion and was, thus, meritless.96 Victor filed a
motion for rehearing on 8 February 1993.9 7 On 10 March 1993, the
Nebraska Supreme Court denied Victor's motion.98
Victor again filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court on IJune 1993, and on 28 September 1993, the
Court granted the writ of certiorari with respect to "[w]hether the
Nebraska Supreme Court erred in failing to reverse the trial court's
refusal to retroactively apply Cage."99
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
In its consolidated opinion, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the judgments of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Victor v. Ne-
braska and the California Supreme Court in Sandoval v. California.100
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.101 The
Court held that, "taken as a whole," the reasonable doubt instructions
and convictions; and (3) finding that he had not been denied effective assistance of coun-
sel. Viwtor, 494 N.W.2d at 568. In addition, Victor also sought relief based on the failure of
previous counsel to disclose a conflict of interest in representing defendant and in failing
to submit evidence in support of the pretrial motion for change of venue. Id. at 570.
93 Id. at 572.
94 474 N.W.2d 660 (Neb. 1991).
95 Id. at 663. In Morley, the Nebraska Supreme Court had found the language in the
instruction distinguishable from the language found unconstitutional in Cage. The court
held that the Court's decision in Cage did not require reversal of defendants' convictions,
since the instruction given in Morley did not place the state's burden of proof below the
required reasonable doubt standard. Id. at 670.
96 State v. Viwtor, 242 Neb. at 311.
97 Brief for Petitioner at 9, Victor v. Nebraska, 112 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (No. 92-8894).
98 Id.
99 Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 39 (1993); Petitioner's Brief at 12, Victor (92-8894).
100 Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1243 (1994). The Supreme Court consolidated
these cases at 114 S. Ct. 40 (1994).
101 Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part
II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, iI, and IV, in which ChiefJustice
Rehnquist andJustices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined, and in which Justice
Ginsburgjoined with respect to Parts I-B and IV.
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in Victor and in Sandoval properly communicated the idea of reason-
able doubt.10 2 The Court found no "reasonable likelihood" that the
jury interpreted the instructions improperly. 10 3 Justice O'Connor also
examined the attempts made by the California and Nebraska pattern
jury instruction committees to define reasonable doubt in their re-
spective jury instructions.1
0 4
Justice O'Connor first clarified the due process requirements
concerning the reasonable doubt standard.'0 5 According to her anal-
ysis, "so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the
defendant's guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt .... the Con-
stitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in
advising the jury of the government's burden of proof."106 Following
its precedent, the Court did not prescribe a certain definition of rea-
sonable doubt for jury instructions.
As to the current state of the law, Justice O'Connor noted that, in
Cage,10 7 the Court held that the trial court's definition of reasonable
doubt violated the Due Process Clause.' 0 8 Subsequently, the Court in
Estelle v. McGuire,'09 clarified that the proper inquiry as to whether the
jury instruction is unconstitutional is "not whether the instruction
'could have' been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply
it." 110
After reviewing the current case law on the constitutionality of
jury instructions on reasonable doubt, Justice O'Connor stated that
the constitutional question presented by the consolidated cases of
Victor and Sandoval was "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on
proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard"' of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
112
102 Vitor, 114 S. Ct. at 1251 (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140
(1954)).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1242-51.
105 Id. at 1243.
106 Id.
107 498 U.S. 39 (1990).
108 Vitor, 114 S. Ct at 1243.
109 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
110 Vtor, 114 S. Ct. at 1243.
"I1 The Winship standard requires the state to prove each element of a charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). For discussion of Winship,
see infra notes 22 to 30 and accompanying text.
112 Victor 114 S. Ct. at 1243.
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1. Sandoval v. California
Justice O'Connor first looked to the reasonable doubt instruction
the trial court gave to the jury in SandovaL" 3 According to Justice
O'Connor, California's reasonable doubt instruction originated from
a jury instruction Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court gave in Commonwealth v. Webster." 4 In 1927 the Califor-
nia legislature adopted the Webster definition of reasonable doubt as
the statutory definition," 5 and the trial court gave this instruction in
SandovaL"16
Next, Justice O'Connor examined each of Sandoval's objections
to the reasonable doubt instruction." 7 In a lengthy exposition of the
eighteenth and nineteenth-century legal texts that define the con-
cepts "moral evidence" and "moral certainty," she developed a histori-
cal context to evaluate the continuing validity of the phrases."1
8
AlthoughJustice O'Connor willingly conceded that the phrase "moral
evidence" is "not a mainstay of the modem lexicon," she asserted that
she did not think the phrase "means anything different today than it
did in the 19th century."" 9 Justice O'Connor found support for this
conclusion in the fact that three modern dictionaries that define
"moral evidence" provide definitions which are consistent with the
original meaning. 12
0
Finally, Justice O'Connor looked to the instruction given by the
trial court in Sandoval, which provided that "everything relating to
human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt ... ."121 In reference to the phrase,
"moral evidence," she stated that "in this sentence, [it] can only mean
empirical evidence offered to prove such matters-the proof intro-
113 Id. at 1244.
114 59 Mass. 295 (1850). The definition of reasonable doubt in Webster is as follows:
What is reasonable doubt? ... It is not mere possible doubt; because every thing
relating to human affairs, and depending upon moral evidence, is open to some possi-
ble or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison
and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds ofjurors in that condition that
they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty, of the truth of the
charge.
Webster, 59 Mass. at 320; Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1244.
115 Trwtor, 114 S. Ct at 1244-45; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096a (West 1994).
116 Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1244.
117 Id. at 1245.
118 Id. at 1245-46.
119 Id. at 1246.
120 Id. In support of her conclusion,Justice O'Connor cited WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTrrH
CENTURY DiaroNARY 1168 (2d ed. 1979) ("based on general observation of people, etc.
rather than on what is demonstrable"); Co.INs ENGLISH Dic-oNARu 1014 (3d ed. 1991)
(similar); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DicrsoNA" 1070 (2d ed. 1989) (similar).
121 Vwwtor, 114 S. C. at 1246.
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duced at trial."122 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor found the phrase
"unproblematic" in combination with other instructions steering the
jurors to the evidence presented at trial.123 Thus, she concluded that
the phrase "moral evidence" would not inappropriately cause the jury
to consider the ethics or morality of Sandoval's criminal acts. 124
Justice O'Connor'next addressed Sandoval's objection that the
phrase "moral certainty" had changed meaning since the nineteenth
century, which allowed the jury to convict on proof that did not meet
the reasonable doubt standard. 125 Justice O'Connor readily admitted
that, as "[w]ords and phrases can change meaning over time ....
'moral certainty,' standing alone, might not be recognized by modern
jurors as a synonym for 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt."' 26
Although Sandoval based his objection on dictionary definitions that
defined the phrase in terms of probability,' 27 Justice O'Connor deter-
mined that the "reasonable doubt standard is itself probabilistic." 128
The concern, Justice O'Connor said, should not be that the jury
would take into account probability, but that the jury would under-
stand the phrase to mean "something less than the very high level of
probability required by the Constitution in criminal cases." 129
Sandoval argued further that the phrase "moral certainty" al-
lowed the jury to convict without restricting its consideration to the
evidence adduced at trial.13° Justice O'Connor distinguished the use
of the phrase "moral certainty" in the instruction given in Sandoval
from its use in the instruction the Court deemed unconstitutional in
Cage. She asserted that in the Cage instruction "there was nothing else
... to lend meaning to the phrase [moral certainty]."131 In contrast,
Justice O'Connor found that the surrounding instructions in Sandoval
should have sufficiently directed the jury to base its conclusion on the
evidence presented at trial'1
3 2
While holding that the use of the phrase "moral certainty" was
constitutional, Justice O'Connor nevertheless stated that the Court
122 Id.




127 See, e.g., Brief f6r Petitioner at 18-19, Sandoval v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994)
(No. 92-9049); MERaRM WEBSrER'S COLLEGIATE DICrnoNARY 756 (10th ed. 1993) (defines
"moral certainty" as "probable though not proved"); WEBTER'S NEW WoRD DiCmIoNARY
882 (3d college ed. 1988) (defines "moral certainty" as "based on strong probability").
128 Vttor, 114 S. Ct. at 1247.
129 Id.
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did "not condone the use of the phrase." 133 Paying tribute to Sando-
val's argument that the meaning of the phrase has changed since the
nineteenth centuryJustice O'Connor remarked that the common un-
derstanding of the phrase "moral certainty" may continue to change
until it conflicts with the reasonable doubt standard. 34 Notwithstand-
ing this veiled warning, Justice O'Connor found the phrase "moral
certainty" constitutional because, "in the context of the instructions as
a whole," the phrase did not make it "reasonably likely" that the jury
understood the phrase to allow it to convict on proof lower than the
reasonable doubt standard or on factors other than the government's
proof.135
Justice O'Connor then briefly examined Sandoval's objection to
the trial court's jury instruction that a reasonable doubt is "not a mere
possible doubt."13 6 Justice O'Connor rejected Sandoval's challenge of
this phrase, determining that the sentence as a whole made clear that
a reasonable doubt was to be based on reason, and that, even though
everything "is open to some possible or imaginary doubt," such a
doubt would not qualify as a reasonable doubt.'
3 7
2. Victor v. Nebraska
Justice O'Connor then turned to the jury instruction given by the
trial court in Victor.l38 As in Sandoval, Justice O'Connor first looked to
the historical underpinnings of the instruction. She traced the con-
tent of the Victor instruction both to the instruction given by Chief
Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Webster, 39 and to a series of nine-
teenth-century Nebraska cases approving the use of reasonable doubt
instructions and equating reasonable doubt with an "'actual doubt'
that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act."
140
Justice O'Connor examined each of the objections Victor raised
to the reasonable doubt instruction.141 Agreeing that the "substantial
doubt" construction was "somewhat problematic," Justice O'Connor
contrasted two definitions of "substantial" found in a modern diction-
ary, stating that, "[o] n the one hand, 'substantial' means 'not seeming





137 Id. at 1249.
138 Id.
139 59 Mass. 295 (1850).
140 VWtor, 114 S. Ct. at 1249.
141 Id. at 1250-51.
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gree."' 42 Justice O'Connor determined that the latter, "'commonly
understood"' 143 definition could imply that a greater degree of doubt
is necessary for acquittal.144 However, since the phrase "substantial
doubt" was "'distinguished from a doubt arising from mere possibility,
from bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture,'" it was clear that
the instruction did not misstate the reasonable doubt standard.' 45 To
support her conclusion that "substantial doubt" was acceptable, she
noted that, in contrast to the court's instruction in Victor, the unconsti-
tutional instruction in Cage did not distinguish between a substantial
doubt and a fanciful doubt.146 Additionally, the Court in Cage did not
hold that the use of the phrase "substantial doubt" made the instruc-
tion unconstitutional. 147 Finally, without elucidating the reasoning
for her conclusion, Justice O'Connor found that in the context of the
court's instruction in Victor "substantial" implies an existence of a
doubt rather than the magnitude of the doubt.148 As a result, she
found no cause for concern that the instruction possibly overstated
the degree of doubt required for acquittal. 149
Justice O'Connor gave an alternative justification for upholding
the constitutionality of the reasonable doubt instruction, even if the
equation of a reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt overstated the
degree of doubt necessary to acquit.' 50 Citing previous opinions by
the Court that have approved similar definitions of reasonable doubt,
Justice O'Connor found that the instruction's alternative definition of
reasonable doubt, "doubt that would cause a reasonable person to
hesitate to act," provided a "common-sense benchmark" for what
should constitute substantial doubt.' 5 ' Under this analysis, Justice
O'Connor concluded that it was not reasonably likely that the jury
would have believed the doubt necessary for acquittal to be "anything
other than a reasonable one."
152
Justice O'Connor next examined Victor's objection to the "moral
certainty" portion of the instruction. 153 Again, Justice O'Connor de-
142 Id. at 1250 (quoting WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 2280 (una-
bridged 1981)).
143 Id. (quoting Cage, 498 U.S. at 41).
144 Id.
145 Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 11, Viwtorv. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (No.








153 Id. at 1250-51.
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termined that the context of the phrase "moral certainty"-"such a
doubt as will not permit you, after full, fair, and impartial considera-
tion of all the evidence, to have an abiding conviction, to a moral
certainty, of the guilt of the accused,"-increased the chance that the
jury would interpret the phrase correctly. 54 Determining that the in-
structions equated a "doubt sufficient to preclude moral certainty with
a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act," she
concluded that since a person "morally certain of a fact would not
hesitate to rely on it," that fact must have "been proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."155 According to Justice O'Connor, the language of
the instruction as a whole ensured that the jury did not interpret the
phrase "moral certainty" to mean that it could convict on proof that
failed to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard or on factors other
than the proof presented by the government at trial. 156 As in her dis-
cussion of the instruction given in SandovalJustice O'Connor discour-
aged the use of the phrase "moral certainty," but nonetheless asserted
that its inclusion in the instruction the court in Victor gave did not
diminish its constitutionality.
157
Justice O'Connor summarily disposed of Victor's final objection
to the reasonable doubt instruction that the reference to "strong
probabilities" reduced the government's burden of proof. Again look-
ing at the context of the phrase, Justice O'Connor found that the en-
tire instruction, qualifying "strong probabilities" as "such probabilities
[that] are strong enough to exclude any doubt of his guilt that is rea-
sonable," cured any possible problem with the phrase.158 To support
her reasoning, Justice O'Connor cited the Court's opinion in Dunbar
v. United States,159 upholding an instruction that used identical lan-
guage and decided that the century-old Dunbar was still controlling
law.'6
0
In affirming the judgment of the California Supreme Court in
Sandoval and the judgment of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Victor,
Justice O'Connor concluded that as a whole the reasonable doubt in-
structions "correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt."161
Thus, there was no reasonable likelihood that the juries in these two
cases applied the jury instructions in an unconstitutional manner.
62
154 Id. at 1250.
155 Id. at 1250-51.
156 Id. at 1251.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 156 U.S. 185 (1895).





B. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennedy concurred in full with the opinion of Justice
O'Connor,163 but wrote separately to express his belief that some of
the phrases to which Sandoval and Victor objected "confuse far more
than they clarify."' 64 Pointing to California's use of the phrase "moral
evidence," he stated that its inclusion in the reasonable doubt instruc-
tion is "indefensible," and, although the majority provided the deriva-
tion of the phrase, it is clear that "for jurors who have not had the
benefit of the Court's research, the words will do nothing but baf-
fle."' 65 Nevertheless, he agreed with Justice O'Connor's determina-
tion that the use of the phrase "moral evidence" does not necessitate
finding the California reasonable doubt instruction unconstitu-
tional. 166 Justice Kennedy left open the possibility that the "inclusion
of words so malleable, because so obscure, might in other circum-
stances have put the whole instruction at risk."
167
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND
CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT
Justice Ginsburg agreed that the reasonable doubt instructions in
Victor and Sandoval satisfied the Constitution's due process require-
ment. In addition, the instructions conveyed to the jurors the idea
that they should focus only on the evidence presented.1 68 In her opin-
ion, Justice Ginsburg addressed the issues raised by the instruction in
Victor's appeal.
Apart from agreeing with the majority that the "moral certainty"
phrasing "should be avoided as an unhelpful way of explaining what
reasonable doubt means," Justice Ginsburg found two other features
of the reasonable doubt instruction in Victor unhelpful. 169 First, Jus-
tice Ginsburg criticized the instruction's definition of reasonable
doubt as "such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and prudent per-
son, in one of the graver and more important transactions of life, to
pause and hesitate before taking the represented facts as true and re-
lying and acting thereon."'70 Using published criticisms of the "hesi-
tate to act" formulation as support,' 71 Justice Ginsburg indicated that
163 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
164 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
166 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
167 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168 Id. at 1252 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
169 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
170 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
171 See FEDERALJUDICIAL CTR., PATrERN CRIMINALJURY INSTRUCTIONS 18-19 (1987) (com-
mentary on instruction 21);JudgeJon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt," 68 N.Y.U. L.
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the instruction's analogy between an individual's decision-making
process in his or her personal affairs and a juror's decision-making
process in deciding the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant was
inapplicable and ambiguous. 172
Justice Ginsburg next turned to the instruction which informed
the jury that it could "find an accused guilty upon the strong
probabilities of the case, provided such probabilities are strong
enough to exclude any doubt of his guilt that is reasonable." 173 Jus-
tice Ginsburg criticized such an instruction for its "uninstructive circu-
larity."' 74 As Justice Ginsburg succinctly stated, "Jury comprehension
is scarcely advanced when a court 'defines' reasonable doubt as
'doubt ... that is reasonable.'"'175
These criticisms of particular portions of the reasonable doubt
instruction in Victor led Justice Ginsburg to propose a definition of
reasonable doubt, drafted by the Federal Justice Center, that she be-
lieved to be workable.' 76 While noting that two of the Federal Courts
of Appeals have deemed attempts at definition ill-advised, Justice
Ginsburg rejected the idea that the trial court should not define rea-
sonable doubt, because "even if definitions of reasonable doubt are
necessarily imperfect, the alternative-refusing to define the concept
at all-is not obviously preferable." 7
7
Despite her criticism of the instructions given in Victor, Justice
Ginsburg concluded that the instructions given in both Victor and San-
doval were constitutional. 178 In reaching this conclusion, she stated
REv. 979 (1993).
172 Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1252 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
173 Id. (quoting NJI 14.08) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
174 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
175 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
176 Id. at 1253 (GinsburgJ., concurring). The text of the FederalJudicial Center's defi-
nition of reasonable doubt is as follows:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the de-
fendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute
certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every
possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly con-
vinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If
on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must
give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.
FEDERALJUDICIAL CTm, supra note 171, at 17-18.
177 Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1252 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In United States v. Adkins, 937
F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1991), the court stated that "[t]his circuit has repeatedly warned against
giving the jury definitions of reasonable doubt, because definitions tend to impermissibly
lessen the burden of proof." Adkins, 937 F.2d at 950. In United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d
1036 (7th Cir. 1988), the court upheld the district court's refusal to provide a definition of
reasonable doubt, despite the jury's request, because "at best, definitions of reasonable
doubt are unhelpful to ajury .... An attempt to define reasonable doubt presents a risk
without any real benefit." Hall, 854 F.2d at 1039.
178 Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1253-54 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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that the test used to evaluate the constitutionality of a reasonable
doubt instruction is not whether the instruction is exemplary, but
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury correctly under-
stood from the instruction the concept of reasonable doubt.179
D. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND
DISSENTING IN PART
Justice Blackmun concurred in the Court's opinion with respect
to Sandoval, but dissented with respect to Victor.'8 0
Discussing only the instruction in Victor, Justice Blackmun criti-
cized the majority for its misapplication of the Court's opinion in
Cage,181 because he found "no meaningful difference" between the
reasonable doubt instruction in Victor and the one in Cage.182 Com-
paring the text of the Cage instruction with that of the Victor instruc-
tion, he found a strong similarity in both instructions' equations of
"substantial doubt" with reasonable doubt, and references to "moral
certainty" as opposed to "evidentiary certainty." 83 While acknowledg-
ing that the Victor instruction does not include the phrase "grave un-
certainty," found objectionable by the Court in the Cage instruction,
Justice Blackmun found that the Vctor instruction "contains language
that has an equal potential to mislead."'
84
First, Justice Blackmun criticized Justice O'Connor's opinion for
attempting to distinguish the "substantial doubt" language in the
Victor instruction from that in the Cage instruction. 8 5 Starting with
Justice O'Connor's concession that "substantial," as it is commonly un-
179 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
180 Id. at 1259 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter
joined Justice Blackmun except with respect to justice Blackmun's support for vacating the
death sentences in both cases per his dissent in Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994).
181 498 U.S. 39 (1990).
182 Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1254. The reasonable doubt instruction given in Cage is as
follows:
If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element necessary to constitute
the defendant's guilt, it is your duty to give him the benefit of that doubt and return a
verdict of not guilty. Even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, if it
does not establish such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you must acquit the accused.
This doubt, however, must be a reasonable one; that is one founded upon a real tangi-
ble substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such a
doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the
unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a
mere possible doubt. It is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable
man can seriously entertain. What is required is not an absolute or mathematical
certainty, but a moral certainty.
Cage, 498 U.S. at 40.
183 Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1259 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184 Id. at 1255-56 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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derstood, means "that specified to a large degree," Justice Blackmun
rejected her assertion that the jury would not have interpreted sub-
stantial in this manner because, in contrast to its use in Cage, the
phrase "substantial doubt" was used to distinguish reasonable doubt
from mere conjecture.1 86 Instead, he asserted that the instruction in
Cage did use the phrase "substantial doubt" to distinguish reasonable
doubt from "mere possible doubt," and that it was not the instruc-
tion's failure to provide the "appropriate contrasting language" that
doomed the instruction in .Cage.'87 In Justice Blackmun's view, the
Court found the instruction in Cage unconstitutional simply because
"'substantial' and 'grave,' as they are commonly understood, suggest a
higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the rea-
sonable doubt standard." 88
Next, Justice Blackmun attacked the majority's assertion that the
instruction in Cage was flawed only because of the combined use of
the phrases "substantial doubt" and "grave uncertainty." 89 Looking
to the Court's language in Cage, he dismissed this interpretation of the
Cage decision, stating that the. Court in Cage had not been preoccu-
pied with the combined use of these two phrases. 90 Rather, the
Court declared the instruction in Cage unconstitutional simply be-
cause "substantial" suggests a higher degree of doubt.' 9 ' According to
Justice Blackmun, the Court in Cage "endorsed the universal opinion"
of the federal appellate courts that equating "substantial doubt" with
reasonable doubt misstates the necessary degree of doubt under the
reasonable doubt standard.'
92
Justice Blackmun then rebutted Justice O'Connor's assertion that
the instruction in Victor, in contrast to the instruction in Cage, was
saved by providing an alternative definition of reasonable doubt,
namely, hesitation to act.' 93 While noting his skepticism of the help-
fulness of the "hesitate to act" formulation, Justice Blackmun con-
cluded that the "existence of an 'alternative' and accurate definition
of reasonable doubt somewhere in the instruction does not render
the instruction lawful if it is 'reasonably likely' that the jury would rely
186 Id. at 1256 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192 Id. at 1256-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193 Id. at 1257 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor argued that, with this alternative definition, the jury would not have interpreted
"substantial doubt" to mean "specified to a large degree." Id. at 1250.
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on the faulty definition during its deliberations."' 94 Justice Blackmun
illustrated that "the instruction in Cage contained proper statements
of the law .... but this language could not salvage the instruction
since it remained reasonably likely that ... the jury understood the
instruction to require 'a higher degree of doubt than is required for
acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard.'"'195
Turning to the majority's discussion of the "strong probabilities"
language in the instruction in Victor, Justice Blackmun used Justice
O'Connor's own mandate that, "'[t]aken as a whole, the instructions
[must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the
jury,"' to refute her dismissal of the phrase's harmful effects.
196 Jus-
tice Blackmun criticized the majority for accepting the "strong
probabilities" language since, "[c ] onsidering the instruction in its en-
tirety,. . . the 'strong probabilities' language increased the likelihood
that the jury understood 'substantial doubt' to mean 'to a large de-
gree. '"" 97 Associating the word probability with "likelihood," Justice
Blackmun concluded that ajury could have a substantial doubt about
a defendant's guilt but still convict on the "strong probabilities" of the
case where the jury considered it "likely" that the defendant commit-
ted the crimes charged. 198 Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the
instruction in Victor qualified the "strong probabilities" language with
language stating that "strong probabilities" are to be "'strong enough
to exclude any doubt of his guilt that is reasonable."' 199 However, Jus-
tice Blackmun found this qualification ineffectual since the suc-
ceeding sentence defines a reasonable doubt as a "substantial
doubt."20 0 In this configuration, the purported clarification of the
"strong probabilities" language only adds more confusion.201
Finally, Justice Blackmun took issue with the reference to "moral
certainty" in the instruction in Victor.202 Turning again to Cage, Justice
Blackmun noted that the Court condemned the instruction in Cage
for its reference to "moral certainty," because of a "real possibility that
such language would lead jurors reasonably to believe that they could
base their decision to convict upon moral standards or emotion in
194 Id. at 1257 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Boyde v.
California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990)).
195 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Cage v. Louisi-
ana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990)).
196 Id. at 1257-58 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197 Id. at 1258 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
198 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
199 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
201 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202 Id. at 1258-59 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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addition to or instead of evidentiary standards."203 In Justice Black-
mun's view, the "moral certainty" language in the instruction in Victor
created the same problems. Indeed, Justice Blackmun found that its
use in conjunction with the "strong probabilities" and "substantial
doubt" language was "mutually reinforcing, both overstating the de-
gree of doubt necessary to acquit and understating the degree of cer-
tainty required to convict."
20 4
For these reasons, Justice Blackmun concluded that the Court
should have reversed Victor's conviction and remanded it for a new
trial.205
In keeping with his dissent in Callins v. Collins,20 6 Justice Black-
mun dissented from the affirmance of the judgment of the Supreme
Court of California. Although concurring in the majority's opinion
with respect to Sandoval, he stated that the Court should vacate Sando-
val's death sentence. 20 7 He also stated that the Court should vacate




The Court incorrectly decided both Victor and SandovaL In re-
jecting Victor's and Sandoval's constitutional challenges of the defini-
tion of reasonable doubt in their respective jury instructions, the
Court improperly restricted its recent unanimous holding in Cage to
its facts. In determining that the jury instructions were constitutional,
the Court failed to address frankly the merits of these appeals in light
of its decision in Cage, and in light of a common-sense understanding
of reasonable doubt.
The Court relied on eighteenth and nineteenth-century cases
and texts to analyze the manner in which a contemporary jury would
understand an instruction.20 9 Adopting such an approach, the Court
gave insufficient weight to the fact that the meanings of the objected-
203 Id. at 1258 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204 Id. at 1258-59 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Blackmun argued that it is the combination of these phrases that distinguished the instruc-
tion in Vicotr from the instruction in SandovaL In Sandoval, although the trial court used
the phrases "moral certainty" and "moral evidence," it did not use them in combination
with phrases such as "substantial doubt" and "strong probabilities" that overstate the de-
gree of doubt required under the reasonable doubt standard.
205 Id. at 1259 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
206 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994). In his dissent from the denial for a writ of certiorari in
CalinsJustice Blackmun concluded that the death penalty, as currently administered, was
unconstitutional. Id.
207 Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1259 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
208 Id. (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209 Id. at 1245-46, 1251.
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to phrases in both instructions have changed over time and that the
instructions may not provide twentieth-century jurors with an ade-
quate understanding of the reasonable doubt standard. In fact, as Jus-
tice Kennedy hinted, the derivation of a legal phrase is irrelevant to
the meaning it suggests in common usage.21 0 Furthermore, the Court
did not address the possibility that the average juror may have never
had a clear understanding of the language of the instructions-even
when initially written. Through the obfuscation of a long discussion
concerning the history of the instructions, the Court avoided honestly
answering whether the instructions uphold the constitutional man-
date to allow conviction only where the prosecution has proven guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. SA-,VDOVAL V. CALIFORNIA
In evaluating the instruction in Sandoval, the Court traced its gen-
esis to the definition by Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court given in 1850 in Commonwealth v. Webster
21
The Court stressed the repeated approval of the Webster definition by
nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century courts as evidence of
its long-term support,212 but ignored contemporaneous and subse-
quent criticism of that definition. In particular, the Court failed to
respond to criticism of the definition's reliance on "moral evidence"
and "moral certainty." The Court accepted the Webster definition with-
out analyzing whether it was sound, as if the definition's repeated use
overcomes any of its shortcomings.
As early as 1876, a contemporary of Shaw, Judge John Wilder
May, characterized the Webster definition as "unsuccessful" and "unfor-
tunate."213 Asserting that the "rules of law should be stated with un-
mistakable precision," May decried courts' adoption of the "moral
certainty" language found in the Webster definition.2 14 Tracing the ori-
gin of the use of "moral certainty" in legal works to its inclusion by
Thomas Starkie in his treatise on evidence, 215 May criticized the use of
210 Id. at 1251 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
211 Id. at 1244 (citing Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295 (1850)). The Webster
definition of reasonable doubt is provided supra note 114.
212 Vwctor, 114 S. Ct. at 1244. In the Court's opinion,Justice O'Connor cites Perovich v.
United States, 205 U.S. 86, 92 (1907); People v. Paulsell, 115 Cal. 6, 12 (1896); People v.
Strong, 30 Cal. 151, 155 (1866).
213 May, supra note 7, at 663.
214 Id.
215 In his treatise on evidence, Starkie equated moral certainty with proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, stating:
Evidence which satisfies the minds of the jury of the truth of the fact in dispute, to the
entire exclusion of every reasonable doubt, constitutes full proof of the fact .... Even
the most direct evidence can produce nothing more than such a high degree of
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the phrase in Webster, asking, "why perplex the administration ofjus-
tice by interjecting this new element of uncertainty ... [for w]hat
possible end can such a heaping up of indefinable terms serve, but to
confuse and baffle rather than enlighten and aid the average ju-
ror?"216  Clearly, May considered the instruction to be
counterproductive.
Similarly, Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, criticized the Web-
ster definition for its lack of clarity and utility.217 Though recognizing
the repeated use of the definition, Wigmore wrote that "when any-
thing more than a simple caution and a brief definition is given, the
matter tends to become one of mere words, and the actual effect
upon the jury, instead of being enlightenment, is likely to be rather
confusion, or, at the least, a continued incomprehension." 218 Thus,
Wigmore believed the definition did not help juries decide the guilt
or innocence of a defendant.
The most biting criticism of the Webster definition appeared in a
1906 article in which Professor Trickett ridiculed the circularity of the
definition. Arguing that the definition did not provide the juror with
a comprehensible definition of reasonable doubt, Trickett stated that
it "is impossible to see how an ordinary juror is to be aided by being
told that if he is morally certain of the prisoner's guilt, to convict
him."219 Here, only fifty years after Webster, Trickett deemed "moral
certainty" to be a failure in elucidating the meaning of reasonable
doubt
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in Hopt v. Utah,220 criticized
the Webster definition. The Court, holding a reasonable doubt jury
instruction 221 constitutional, distinguished the instruction at issue
from the one in Commonwealth v. Webster.222 The Court in Hopt stated,
probability as amounts to moral certainty.
THoMAs STAmEI, LAw OF EVIDENCE 478 (London, J & W.T. Clarke) (2d ed. 1833).
216 May, supra note 7, at 658.
217 9 WIGMORE § 2497, at 405-09 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
218 Id. at 406.08.
219 William Trickett, Preponderance of Evidence, and Reasonable Doub, 10 FORUM 75, 85
(1906).
220 120 U.S. 430 (1887).
221 The reasonable doubt instruction in Hopt was as follows:
The court further charges you that a reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, and
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. And if, after an impartial comparison
and consideration of all the evidence, you can candidly say that you are not satisfied of
the defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but if after such impartial compar-
ison and consideration of all the evidence, you can truthfully say that you have an
abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt, such as you would be willing to act upon
in the more weighty and important matters relating to your own affairs, you have no
reasonable doubt.
Hopt, 120 U.S. at 439.
222 Id. at 440.
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"[t]he difficulty with [the Webster] instruction is, that the words 'to a
reasonable and moral certainty' add nothing to the words 'beyond a
reasonable doubt;' one may require explanation as much as the
other."223 The Court in Hopt, more familiar with nineteenth-century
jurors' ability to comprehend definitions of legal terms than the
Rehnquist Court, felt that the use of "moral certainty" made the in-
struction problematic.
Without acknowledging these early criticisms of the Webster defini-
tion, the Court looked at nineteenth-century sources affirming the
Webster instruction to support its conclusion that the instruction in
Sandoval was constitutional. The Court's selective reading of these
sources suggests that it was straining to uphold constitutionally sus-
pect convictions.
Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that the phrases "moral ev-
idence" and "moral certainty" may not be as accessible to the modem
juror as these phrases were to jurors in the nineteenth century.
2 24 Jus-
tice O'Connor agreed that: (1) the phrase "moral evidence" is not a
"mainstay of the modem lexicon"; (2) "'moral certainty,' standing
alone, might not be recognized by modern jurors as a synonym for
'proof beyond a reasonable doubt'"; and (3) "[a] s modem dictionary
definitions attest, the common meaning of the phrase [moral cer-
tainty] has changed" since the nineteenth century.2 25 The Court
should not have downplayed these concerns, especially after acknowl-
edging historic ambiguity of the phrase. The Court glossed over the
admitted problems with the language in the instruction in Sandoval,
claiming that the instruction as a whole was acceptable, even though
the components of the instruction were not acceptable.
B. VICTOR V AEBRASKA
In reaching its conclusion in Victor, the Court focused on differ-
entiating Nebraska's reasonable doubt instruction from the reason-
able doubt instruction given in Cage. The Court's emphasis on
distinguishing Cage from Victor suggests that the Court wanted to limit
the Cage decision to its facts, and thus, only the precise wording given
in Cage itself would prompt the Court to declare an instruction uncon-
stitutional. By limiting Cage in this way, the Court has taken on the
task of reviewing claims disputing the constitutionality of reasonable
doubt jury instructions on a case-by-case basis, instead of providing
decisions with precedential value. As in its analysis in Sandoval, the
223 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850)).
224 Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1246-48 (1994).
225 Id.
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Court again failed to acknowledge the underlying issue: the language
in the instruction in Victor does not adequately convey the concept of
reasonable doubt to the modem juror.
After noting that much of the instruction derived from the Web-
ster definition,226 the Court dismissed Victor's challenge that the equa-
tion of reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt overstated the
degree of doubt necessary for acquittal.2 27 While acknowledging that
the "construction is somewhat problematic," the Court minimized the
fact that a modem dictionary defines "substantial" as "specified to a
large degree."228 The Court recognized that such a definition could
lead ajuror to believe that the degree of doubt required for acquittal
was greater than that required under the reasonable doubt stan-
dard.229 Nevertheless, the Court, without elucidating its reasoning,
merely assumed that jurors would not consider substantial to mean
large because the "context [of the definition] makes clear that 'sub-
stantial' is used in the sense of existence rather than magnitude of the
doubt."23 0
The Court baldly stated that the "moral certainty" language of the
instruction in Victor did not render the instruction unconstitutional, as
was the case in Cage, because the "problem in Cage was that the rest of
the instruction provided insufficient context to lend meaning to the
226 See discussion infra notes 211 to 225 and accompanying text.
227 T/wto, 114 S. Ct. at 1249-50.
228 Id. at 1250 (quoting WmsrTmE's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 2280 (una-
bridged 1981)).
229 In United States v. Atkins, 487 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1973), the court stated that it did
not approve of the equation of reasonable doubt and substantial doubt. Atkins, 487 F.2d at
260. In clarifying this point, the court noted that in an earlier state case, defense counsel
had illustrated the difference between "substantial" doubt and "reasonable" doubt by
pointing out how differently a person would feel if a person questioned the doctor as to
the prospects for a successful outcome of a serious operation and the doctor told him
there was a reasonable chance of success as opposed to a substantial chance of success. Id.
at 260 n.2.
2s0 Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1250. No case prior to Vztormakes the same distinction between
"magnitude of the doubt" and "existence" of the doubt asJustice O'Connor made in con-
cluding that the phrase "substantial doubt" did not overstate the degree of doubt necessary
for acquittal. However, since the Court's decision in Viwtor, lower courts have used the
Court's reasoning to find reasonable doubtjury instructions with similar language constitu-
tional. In Middleton v. Evatt, 855 F. Supp. 837 (1994), the court denied defendant's
habeas corpus petition in which the defendant challenged the trial court's use of the term
"substantial doubt" in its reasonable doubt jury instruction. Middeton, 855 F. Supp. at 852.
Although noting that the Court in VWtor acknowledged that the construction "substantial
doubt" was "somewhat problematic," the court in Middeton cited the Court's reasoning in
Victor and found that, in the context of the sentence in which it was contained and in the
context of the entire instruction, the phrase was constitutional. Id. See also State v. Smith,
637 So. 2d 398, 406 (La. 1994) (court found reasonable doubt jury instruction constitu-
tional, finding that the phrase "substantial doubt" was used in the "sense of the existence
rather than the magnitude or degree of the doubt necessary to acquit").
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phrase" and the instruction in Victor is not "similarly deficient."23'
The instruction in Cage also contained accurate statements of law, but
was found unconstitutional, and the Court does not explain how cor-
rect statements of law can cure an improper statement of law found in
the same instruction. Justice Blackmun soundly argued that such
transformation of an instruction's lawfulness cannot occur "if it is 'rea-
sonably likely' that the jury would rely on the faulty definition during
its deliberations."2 32
As in its analysis of the language in the instruction in Sandoval,
the Court used nineteenth-century support to find the instruction in
Victor constitutional. The Court rejected Victor's challenge to the use
of "strong probabilities" in the instruction, basing its decision on its
1895 holding in Dunbar v. United States.23 3 In Dunbar, the Court up-
held a reasonable doubt jury instruction that directed the jury to de-
cide the defendant's guilt or innocence "upon the strong probabilities
of the case."23 4 Notably, however, no state besides Nebraska has con-
sistently used "strong probabilities" in its reasonable doubt jury in-
struction in the twentieth century, making the Court's use of Dunbar
as support for its acceptance of the "strong probabilities" language all
the more unconvincing.23
5
The reasonable doubt instruction in Victor failed to provide the
jury with comprehensible statements of the law, thus allowing the jury
to convict Victor without an adequate understanding of what consti-
tutes reasonable doubt.
C. REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTIONS IN THE STATE COURTS
The Court did not acknowledge that Nebraska's reasonable
doubtjury instruction in Victor and California's jury instruction in San-
doval are in the minority among states in their use of the phrases
"moral certainty" and "moral evidence." Numerous state courts have
held that language similar to that found in Sandoval and Victor may
mislead jurors to consider issues of morality in determining a defend-
231 Vwtor, 114 S. Ct. at 1250.
232 Id. at 1257 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Boyde v.
California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)).
233 156 U.S. 185, 199 (1895).
234 Id. at 199.
235 Ohio also used the phrase "strong probabilities" in its reasonable doubt jury instruc-
tions, but it used the phrase to tell the jury that if it found that "there are only strong
probabilities of guilt," then it was to acquit. See State v. Theisen, 108 N.E.2d 854 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1952); State v. Seneff, 435 N.E.2d 680 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980). Ohio's current instruc-
tion does not include "strong probabilities" language. OhioJury Instructions, §403.50 Rea-
sonable Doubt (Anderson 1993). The Nebraska reasonable doubt instruction, as revised in
1992, also now omits the "strong probabilities" language objected to in Victor. NJ12d Crim.
2.0 Reasonable Doubt (1992).
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ant's guilt, not just evidence given at trial.236 Furthermore, of the
forty-four states that have a pattern 23 7 or a commonly used reasonable
doubt instruction,238 only six use instructions that contain the phrases
236 The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Byan4 432 S.E.2d 291 (N.C. 1993),
reversed -a conviction where the reasonable doubt instruction included "moral certainty"
language, finding that "[a] jury instruction which emphasizes what is good or bad-a
moral judgment, rather than truth-an evidentiary judgment, is inconsistent" with the
proper role of ajury. The court further noted that "moral certainty" language "increases
the possibility that ajury may convict [a defendant] because the jury believes he is morally
guilty without regard to the sufficiency of the evidence." Id. at 297. In State v. Manning,
409 S.E.2d 372 (S.C. 1991), the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed a defendant's
conviction, holding that the reasonable doubt jury instruction that defined certainty be-
yond a reasonable doubt and moral certainty as the same, misled the jury "in that it allows
ajuror to base a finding of guilt upon a subjective feeling rather than upon an evaluation
of the evidence." Id. at 374. In Vance v. State 416 S.E.2d 516 (Ga. 1992), the Supreme
Court of Georgia, holding that a superseded jury instruction that contained "moral cer-
tainty" language was not reversible error, stated that such language is "unnecessary." Id. at
518 n.5. The court added that "[w]hat is perceived as 'moral' may differ from group to
group, from class to class, and from individual to individual. This diversity renders any
precise definition of 'moral certainty' elusive, and any uniformity of interpretations byju-
rors unlikely." Id.
237 Patternjury instructions emerged in the 1930s as a response to the increasingly tech-
nical nature ofjury instructions given by trial courts which were seeking to avoid reversal.
See STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM 230
(1994); Schwarzer, supra note 19, at 786. "Pattern jury instructions, sometimes known as
standard, model, uniform, approved, or recommended jury instructions, are designed to
be accurate and impartial statements of the law .... " Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G.
Thornburg, Juty Instructions: A Pesistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REv. 77, 78 n.8
(1988). These pattern instructions are generally drafted by the judges of a state's supreme
court, state bar association, judicial council, or, more rarely, an administrative office of a
court or by private effort. Id. Pattern instructions have several goals: (1) to save the court
and counsel time in the preparation ofjury instructions; (2) to improve the accuracy of the
instructions, and thus, to reduce the number of appeals and reversals based on challenges
to jury instructions; (3) to eliminate argumentative instructions prepared by each side's
counsel; and (4) to improve jury comprehension. Schwarzer, supra note 19, at 737-38. See
also ROBERTJ. NIELAND, PATrERNJURY INSTRUCTIONS: A CRITICAL LOOK AT A MODERN MOVE-
MENT TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM 2-3, 13 (1979).
238 Although outside the scope of this note, federal courts also use pattern jury instruc-
tions. One frequently cited instruction does not use the phrases "moral certainty" and
"moral evidence." It reads:
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense-the kind of
doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reason-
able doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable
person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her
own affairs.
HON. EDWARDJ. DErT ET At-, FEDERALJuRY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL AND CRIMI-
NAL, §12.10 Presumption of Innocence, Burden of Proof, and Reasonable Doubt (4th ed.
1992). For other pattern reasonable doubt jury instructions, for the various federal cir-
cuits, see, for example, COMMITTEE ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONs WITHIN THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINALJURY INSTRUCTIONS, 3.11 Reasonable Doubt
(1994); COMMrITEE ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUrr, 3.03 Reasonable Doubt-Defined (1992); SIXT CIR-
curr DIST. JUDGES ASS'N PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION COMM., PATTERN CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 1.03 Presumption of Innocence, Burden of Proof, Reasonable Doubt
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"moral certainty" or "moral evidence" or both.23 9 The six states still
consistently using this language include Massachusetts, 240 Califor-
nia,24 1  Idaho,24 2  North Dakota,2 43  Ohio,244  and Tennessee. 245
(1991).
239 Nebraska's reasonable doubt jury instruction, NJI 14.08, challenged in Vtor, was
revised in 1992, and the revised reasonable doubt instruction no longer contains the
phrase "moral certainty." The reasonable doubt instruction reads as follows:
A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and common sense after careful and
impartial consideration of all the evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof
so convincing that you would rely and act upon it without hesitation in the more
serious and important transactions of life. However, proof beyond a reasonable doubt
does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt.
NJI2d Crim. 2.0 Reasonable Doubt (1992). The Comment to the instruction stated that
the goal of the revised instruction was to "achieve juror comprehension through instruc-
tions stated simply, directly, and in plain language." Id.
240 The Massachusetts reasonable doubt jury instruction is a modernized version of the
Webster definition. It reads as follows:
What is reasonable doubt; The term is often used and probably pretty well under-
stood, though it is not easily defined. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not
mean proof beyond all possible doubt, for everything in the lives of human beings is
open to some possible or imaginary doubt. A charge is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt if, after you have compared and considered all the evidence, you have in your
minds an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, that the charge is true.
Massachusetts Model Jury Instructions 2.05 (1988 ed.).
241 California uses CALJIC 2.90, the reasonable doubt instruction at issue in SandovaL
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
242 Idaho's reasonable doubt instruction, currently approved in case law, reads as
follows:
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon evidence or lack of evidence and upon
reason and common sense-the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person
hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a
convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon
it in the most important of his own affairs .... If after going over in your minds the
entire case, you have an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the
charge, then you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Hoffman, 851 P.2d 934 (1993); State v. Rhoades, 822 P.2d 960 (1991).
243 North Dakota uses the following reasonable doubt instruction:
The phrase 'reasonable doubt' means what the words imply. It is a doubt based on
reason arising from a thorough and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the
case. It is that state of mind in which you do not feel an abiding conviction amounting
to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge. While you cannot convict the Defend-
ant on mere surmise or conjecture, neither should you go outside the evidence to
imagine doubts tojustify acquittal. If, after careful deliberation, you are convinced to
a moral certainty that the Defendant is guilty of the crime charged, then you are satis-
fied beyond a reasonable doubt.
State Bar Ass'n of North Dakota, North Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction-Criminal, NDJI-
Criminal 2002 (1990).
244 Ohio uses the following reasonable doubt instruction:
Reasonable doubt is present when, after you have carefully considered and compared
all the evidence, you cannot say you are firmly convinced of the truth of the charge.
Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense. Reasonable doubt
is not mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs or depending
on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. Proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt is proof of such character that an ordinary person would be willing to
rely and act upon it in the most important of his own affairs.
Ohio Jury Instructions, § 403.50 Reasonable Doubt (Anderson 1993).
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Though states have increasingly moved away from this language, the
Court's decision may reverse that trend.246 Although the Court ex-
pressed concern that some of the phrases in the instructions were "not
... mainstay[s] of the modern lexicon," and had "lost... historical
meaning," and were "somewhat problematic," the Court's decision al-
lows state courts to continue using the challenged phrases. State
courts may now point to the Victor and Sandoval decision as an indica-
tion that even though the Court may not advocate the use of such
phrases, such use will not render the instructions unconstitutional.
D. THE COURT'S MOTIVATION
Even though the Court seemed reticent in its approval of some of
the individual phrases contained in the reasonable doubt instructions,
the Court stated, in its discussion of the instruction in Sandovai that it
was unable to hold the reasonable doubt jury instructions unconstitu-
tional because of its lack of supervisory power over the state courts.
247
The Court failed to acknowledge that in Cage, its most recent decision
evaluating a reasonable doubt instruction, the Court did exercise its
supervisory power over the state courts. When the Court found in
Cage that there was a possibility that the jurors could have interpreted
the reasonable doubt instruction incorrectly and therefore may have
convicted Cage on a degree of proof lower than that required under
245 Tennessee's reasonable doubt instruction reads as follows:
Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the
case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily as to the
certainty of guilt. Reasonable doubt does riot mean a captious, possible or imaginary
doubt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any crimi-
nal charge, but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every
proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense.
Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) of the Tennessee Judicial Conference,
Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal 2.03 Reasonable Doubt (1992).
246 Since the Court's decision in Victor and Sandoval, numerous state courts have used
the decision, despite the Court's suggestion that some of the phrases used in the Vctor and
Sandoval instructions were troublesome, to support their finding reasonable doubt jury
instructions constitutional. In State v. Moseley, 445 S.E.2d 906 (N.C. 1994), the North
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed Moseley's death sentence, holding the reasonable doubt
instruction constitutional despite its use of phrases such as "moral certainty" and "substan-
tial misgivings." Moseley, 445 S.E.2d at 910. In reaching this conclusion, the court over-
ruled its decision in State v. Bryant, 432 S.E.2d 291 (N.C. 1993), in which the court had
awarded a new trial for errors in a jury instruction similar to the one given in Moseley.
Moseley, 445 S.E.2d at 910. See also Commonwealth v. Gagliardi, 638 N.E.2d 20, 24 (Mass.
1994) (instruction used the phrase "moral certainty" repeatedly); Pettyjohn v. State, 885
S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (instruction stated that moral certainty was re-
quired); People v. Miller, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 666 (1994) (trial court used CALJIC 2.90).
247 In United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983), the Court made clear that,
through its supervisory powers, the Court "may, within limits, formulate procedural rules
not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress... [as a means to] preserve
judicial integrity." Id. at 505.
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the reasonable doubt standard, there was no concern that the Court
lacked supervisory power over the state courts.
An argument made in the respondent's brief in Victor points to
another possible motive for these two decisions. The Court may have
been concerned that a contrary decision would lead to innumerable
appeals by state prisoners seeking retroactive application of the deci-
sion.248 The Court would then have to review numerous convictions
or have its contrary decision result in the reversal of numerous convic-
tions by lower courts because of faulty reasonable doubt jury instruc-
tions.249 Since constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt jury
instructions cannot be analyzed under the harmless error inquiry, as
made clear in Sullivan,250 this result might require relitigating a multi-
tude of cases. To avoid this burden, the Court contented itself with
warnings in the hope of spurring revision of questionable reasonable
doubt jury instructions.
Furthermore, the prospect of numerous retrials brings with it the
potential release of numerous defendants, and this possibility likely
weighed heavily in the Court's deliberation of Victor and Sandoval-
especially in light of the particularly brutal facts of these cases. In
such cases, the Court might have been particularly hesitant to risk the
defendants' retrial and possible release. On balance, however, the
prospect of numerous retrials also brings with it the potential release
of wrongfully convicted inmates. For this reason, to consider that a
contrary decision could lead to the release of numerous defendants
would be antithetical to the reasons for the adherence to the reason-
able doubt standard cited in Winship. The Court in Winship high-
lighted its interest in reducing the risk of wrongful conviction due to
factual error, and its interest in upholding community confidence in
the criminal justice system, by avoiding the conviction of innocent
people. To abide by these necessary interests, consideration of dis-
tasteful consequences, such as the reviewing of numerous convictions
and the possible release of criminal defendants, cannot take
precedence.
E. FUTURE OF REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTIONS
The Court failed to take advantage of an opportunity to solve the
248 Brief for Respondent at 38, Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (No. 92-8894).
249 The Government, in its brief in Sandoval, argued that a contrary ruling by the Court
would "needlessly impose[ I significant retrial costs upon society, likely will cause the re-
lease from custody of many of the worst individuals our criminal justice system has been
able to identify and isolate, and thus will ultimately reduce the public safety." Brief for
Respondent at 16, Sandoval v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (No. 92-9049).
250 See Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2082 (1993).
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confusion as to reasonable doubt jury instructions. By merely relying
on nineteenth-century approval of language similar to the instruction
in Sandoval and by simply distinguishing the arrangement of words in
the instruction in Victorfrom that in the instruction in Cage, the Court
failed to set out an appropriate definition of the reasonable doubt
standard. Although it may not be the role of the Supreme Court to
dictate the precise definition of reasonable doubt to state court juries,
the Supreme Court has rejected the role it so recently assumed in
Cage, in which the Court explicitly rejected language contained within
the instruction.25 Without guidance from the Court, there is no clear
future for reasonable doubt instructions. State courts must indepen-
dently determine the appropriate reasonable doubt instruction, since
the Court has not given them language that unquestionably passes
constitutional muster.~2
Ultimately, the Court's decision in Victor and Sandoval does not
adequately protect the purposes of reasonable doubt standards. The
Court's inability to provide a satisfactory explanation of the concept of
reasonable doubt to jurors may not ensure that defendants are free
from the "risk of convictions resting on factual error" and may reduce
"community confidence" in the criminal justice system. 253
The Court did not provide any support for its conclusion that
modem jurors, despite their possible unfamiliarity with the complex
terminology employed injury instructions would understand the legal
meaning of those instructions. 254 Although Justice O'Connor looked
to modem, non-legal dictionaries in her analysis of the constitutional-
251 See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990).
252 See supra note 246. Federal courts have also used the Victor and Sandoval decisions to
support their finding instructions constitutional despite the Court's hesitant support for
certain phrases contained in the Victorand Sandovalinstructions. In Morley v. Stenberg, 25
F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1994), the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court for the District of
Nebraska, holding that the Court's decision in Victor required reversal of the decision of
the district court, which had held the Nebraska reasonable doubtjury instruction NJI 14.08
unconstitutional. I&. at 690. Nevertheless, the court noted its disapproval with the lan-
guage of the reasonable doubt jury instruction and found that "[i]t is unwise for a trial
court to risk remand and retrial by using a questionable reasonable doubt instruction in
the face of clear Supreme Court disfavor for certain phrases and the myriad of appropriate
instructions that avoid those phrases." Id. at 689-90. See also Middleton v. Evatt, 855 F.
Supp. 837 (D.S.C. 1994).
253 Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
254 Jerome Frank, critical of the jury system, did not consider jury instructions to be an
improvement, stating:
Time and money and lives are consumed in debating the precise words which the
judge may address to the jury, although everyone who stops to see and think knows
that these words might as well be spoken in a foreign language-that, indeed, for all
the jury's understanding of them, they are spoken in a foreign language.
JEROME FRANi, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 181 (1930).
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ity of the instructions, 55 she did not determine whether jurors' un-
derstanding of these terms actually comports with their legal
meaning. Social science studies have repeatedly demonstrated that
jurors consistently fail to comprehend the concepts explained injury
instructions.25 6 Those studies have traced jury confusion to the syntax
of instructions, the manner of presentation, and the general unfamili-
arity of jurors with legal terminology, 257 as well as to jurors' exposure
to the media or other sources of popular culture.2 58 The Court con-
cluded that the juries in Victor and Sandoval understood the instruc-
tions, without acknowledging well-documented evidence to the
contrary.
Although, in the end, the jury must decide the guilt or innocence
of a particular defendant, an appropriate reasonable doubt jury in-
struction would help ensure that no defendant is found guilty on
proof insufficient to meet the demands of due process, or upon fac-
tors other than the evidence admitted at trial. Some critics of reason-
able doubt jury instructions have recommended that there be no
attempt to define reasonable doubt for the jury,259 but this solution
seems inadequate, given jurors' documented lack of understanding of
the concept. While still ajudge for the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, Justice Ginsburg noted that "[t] o arm the jury with the infor-
mation needed for the intelligent performance of its task, the judge
might first endeavor to speak the language of the jurors, and avoid the
255 Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1246-47, 1250 (1994).
256 See Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury In-
structions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 401 (1990) (study of jurors revealed a relatively low rate of comprehension for key
concepts in criminal jury instructions, apparent ineffectiveness of instructions to improve
comprehension, and negative effect of certain instructions); LaurenceJ. Severance et al.,
Toward Criminal Jury Instructions that Jurors Can Understand, 75 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
198 (1984) (results of study demonstrated that jurors without legal training have difficulty
comprehending and applying pattern jury instructions); Severance, supra note 256, at 200;
Steele & Thornburg, supra note 237 (empirical studies ofjurors revealed thatjurors under-
stood less than one half the content of the tested instructions and that the level of compre-
hension doubled when the instructions were rewritten).
257 William H. Erickson, Criminal Jury Instruction, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 285, 292 (1993).
Erickson stated that the wording of instructions causes the greatest juror confusion
because
[jiurors are lay persons, for the most part untrained in the law's concepts and terms of
art, whose sole contact with the law is often through jury instructions .... Attorneys
and trial judges dealing with familiar concepts frequently forget that the bulk of their
vocation is alien to the general public.
Id. at 292. See also, Severance, supra note 256, at 200.
258 Kramer & Koenig, supra note 256, at 429.
259 See People v. Brigham, 599 P.2d 100 (Cal. 1979) (Mosk, J., concurring). For an in-
depth analysis of the need for defining the concept of reasonable doubt, see Diamond,
supra note 31.
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jargon of the legal profession."260 Critical of the instructions in Victor
and Sandova Justice Ginsburg presented an alternative reasonable
doubt instruction drafted by the Federal judicial Center that she con-
sidered to be "clear, straightforward, and accurate ... in stating the
reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensibly."261
There may be no clear consensus as to the proper definition of
reasonable doubt, but currently the individuals who are responsible
for the formulation ofjury instructions are, for the most part, lawyers,
judges, law academics, and legislators. 262 There needs to be a greater
recognition that, although those intimately connected with the legal
system understand legal terms, the average juror does not understand
them. 263 If jurors must decide the guilt or innocence of criminal de-
fendants and whether capital punishment is the appropriate sentence,
then they should have a greater role in deciding what language is
260 Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
261 Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1253 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). For the
text of the Federal Judicial Center's proposed instruction, see supra note 176, at 35.
262 In People v. Freeman, 882 P.2d 249 (Cal. 1994), the Supreme Court of California
affirmed the defendant's conviction. The trial court had slightly modified CALJIC 2.90 in
instructing the jury on the reasonable doubt standard and had informed the jury that the
phrase "moral evidence" meant "mortal" evidence or "evidence from people." In rejecting
defendant's challenge of the instruction, the court clarified that the Supreme Court had
made clear in Victor and Sandoval that trial courts could delete the phrases "moral cer-
tainty" and "moral evidence" from the reasonable doubt jury instruction. The court sug-
gested that the state legislature or the committee responsible for pattern jury instructions
examine CALJIC 2.90 as the "clarity and constitutionality of California's instruction on
reasonable doubt are too important to simply ignore the high court's warning signals [in
V'itor and Sandoval]." Freeman, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 589. The court's request to the state
legislature to examine the reasonable doubt jury instruction has been made before. In
Brigham, Judge Mosk, in his concurring opinion, asked the state legislature to reconsider
CALJIC 2.90, but as the court made clear in Sandoval, 844 P.2d at 878, the state legislature
had not responded to Mosk's entreaty to redraft the instruction. It is not yet clear if the
state legislature will take up the Supreme Court of California's call for change.
263 Numerous commentators have remarked on the disparity in understanding between
the lay person and those involved in the legal arena. See United States v. Witt, 648 F.2d
608, 612 (9th Cir. 1981) (Anderson, J., concurring) (noting that "Itihe term[ ] 'beyond a
reasonable doubt' ... may be in common usage by the populace of this nation, but there is
no demonstrable or reliable evidence ... that a reasohably appropriate definition is in
common usage or well understood by prospective citizen jurors"); Amiram Elwork et al.,
Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1 LAw & HuM. BFHAv. 163, 165
(1977) ("[llegal practitioners ... have developed a traditionally accepted vocabulary with
which to express their ideas. Although this legal jargon becomes a common way of expres-
sing precise legal meanings among judges and lawyers, it is often a completely foreign
language to the layperson-juror."); Steele & Thornburg, supra note 237, at 100 ("As lawyers
speaking to each other use certain words, their knowledge of the underlying case law com-
municates something more to them than a simple dictionary definition of the word would
show. This kind of extra communication, however, is restricted to members of the profes-
sion who understand the use behind the word. It does not extend to lay people on
juries.").
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comprehensible.2 64 As Justice Kennedy remarked in his concurrence
in Victor and Sandoval, "for jurors who have not had the benefit of the
Court's research, the words [contained in the reasonable doubt in-
structions] will do nothing but baffle."2 6 5 Courts must recognize that
jurors, who have been given the responsibility in criminal cases to de-
cide the guilt or innocence of a defendant, and in capital cases to
decide whether to sentence a defendant to death, have not received
the tools with which to carry out this task successfully.
2 66
VI. CONCLUSION
In Victor and Sandova=4 the United States Supreme Court failed to
address petitioners' claims adequately in light of its decision in Cage.
Although the Court disapproved with much of the language in the
instructions, the Court upheld the instructions without giving the
lower courts a clearer picture of acceptable language to use in the
future. In its focus on certain eighteenth and nineteenth-century
cases and texts to analyze the constitutionality of the instructions, the
Court failed to give satisfactory attention to the common-sense under-
standing of the instructions. The meaning assigned to such instruc-
tions by modem jurors may not comport with the eighteenth and
nineteenth-century conception of reasonable doubt.
Most jurors are not well-versed in the law, and reasonable doubt
jury instructions are meant to improve juror comprehension, to fur-
ther the goal of a fair trial. As such, the reasonable doubtjury instruc-
tions should be tailored to the average juror. When ajury has based
its decision on instructions which include the phrases "moral cer-
tainty" and "moral evidence," it may be compelled to look beyond the
evidence presented at trial. The Court's decision affirming the con-
victions and death sentences of Victor and Sandoval signals an erosion
of the constitutional safeguards of the Due Process Clause.
State courts and pattern jury instruction committees should rec-
264 See Steele & Thornburg, supra note 237, at 106 (suggesting that committees responsi-
ble for drafting pattern jury instructions should include laypersons); Peter Meijes Tiersma,
Reforming the Language ofJury Instructions, 22 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 37, 75-77 (1993) (recom-
mending that judges explain to jurors that they can ask questions about the jury instruc-
tions and that pattern jury instruction committees should document the questions jurors
ask).
265 Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1251 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
266 For a discussion of ways to reform jury instructions to increase juror comprehension,
see AmIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKINGJURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982); Robert P.
and Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study ofJuiy
Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306 (1979); EdwardJ. Imwinkelried & Lloyd R. Schwed,
Guidelines for Drafting Understandable Juy Instrutions: An Introduction to the Use of Psychol-
inguistics, 23 CraM. L. BuLL. 135 (1987); Schwarzer, supra note 19, at 743-59; Steele &
Thornburg, supra note 237, at 108-09; Tiersma, supra note 264, at 48-51.
1026 [Vol. 85
1995] EROSION OFDUE PROCESS 1027
ognize that, despite the Court's decision upholding the reasonable
doubt jury instructions, the Court did express concern that the
phrases "moral certainty" and "moral evidence" were problematic.
Those responsible for reforming jury instructions should recognize
the shortcomings of such reasonable doubt jury instructions. To that
end, jurors' understanding of these instructions must receive the ut-
most attention to protect the constitutional guarantees afforded crimi-
nal defendants.
SHELAGH KENNEY
